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Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
JOSE´ ANTONIO CHEIBUB, ZACHARY ELKINS AND
TOM GINSBURG*
The presidential-parliamentary distinction is foundational to comparative politics and at the center of
a large theoretical and empirical literature. However, an examination of constitutional texts suggests a
fair degree of heterogeneity within these categories with respect to important institutional attributes.
These observations indicate that the classic presidential-parliamentary distinction, and the semi-
presidential category, may not be systemic. This article investigates whether the deﬁning attributes that
separate presidential and parliamentary constitutions predict other attributes that are stereotypically
associated with these institutional models. The results suggest the need for considerable skepticism of the
‘systemic’ nature of the classiﬁcation. Indeed, the results imply that in order to predict the powers of a
country’s executive and legislature, it is more useful to know where and when the constitution was written
than whether the country has a presidential or parliamentary system.
The conceptualization of the relationship between executives and legislatures (henceforth
‘forms’ or ‘systems’ of government) is central to scholarship on comparative politics, and no
categorization is more inﬂuential than the tripartite distinction between presidentialism,
parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism. This classiﬁcation has so thoroughly dominated
scholars’ understanding of executive-legislative relations that it has almost no conceptual
competition. In this article, we examine the constitutions that populate these categories and
evaluate the degree to which this time-honored conceptualization captures variance in
executive-legislative relations. That is, we examine whether the classiﬁcation allows one to
predict the various powers and responsibilities of executives and legislatures, many of which
are presumed to follow from presidentialism and parliamentarism. We have reason to be
skeptical, as we explain below.
Most traditional (so-called classic) approaches to categorization require that the objects
under study share a set of ﬁnite deﬁnitional (necessary or sufﬁcient) properties. More
recent approaches to classiﬁcation – such as the well-known prototype (Rosch) and family
resemblance (Witgenstein) models – operate under a more probabilistic assumption, in
which similarly classiﬁed cases are those that share a large number of non-necessary
attributes.1 However, even those operating using a classical approach expect some family
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resemblance: that is, that similarly classiﬁed objects will resemble one another with respect
to a collection of other, elective, attributes. It can be distressing to a taxonomer to ﬁnd
signiﬁcant variation within a given category with respect to elective features, many of
which may also be shared across categories. When biologists categorized the platypus as a
mammal rather than a reptile, for example, they relied on deﬁnitional characteristics
(lactation) over non-deﬁnitional ones (laying eggs, a duck bill) to make their
determination, and thereby emphasized similarities with beavers over lizards or ducks.
In the context of a widely shared taxonomy among scientists and students, classiﬁcation
decisions serve to reinforce perceptions of the similarity and dissimilarity of organisms.
Organisms are assumed to share more characteristics with co-classiﬁed than cross-
classiﬁed organisms. In the ﬁeld of comparative politics, scholars rely on an assumption
that the presidential-parliamentary distinction (deﬁned in various ways) classiﬁes
constitutions that are reasonably homogenous across a range of attributes of executive-
legislative relations. For many scholars, knowing that, for example, Australia is
‘parliamentary’ would seem to summarize much of what they would want to know
about the powers and responsibilities of the Australian parliament, and what makes it
distinct from, say, the US Congress.
Beyond its presumptive descriptive power, the distinction between presidential and
parliamentary systems (henceforth the ‘classical’ approach to the classiﬁcation of
executive-legislative relations) is also hypothesized to exert signiﬁcant explanatory
power over a wide range of outcomes. An incomplete list of such outcomes includes the
survival of democracy, economic policy, budget deﬁcits, economic performance, social
cleavage management, ethnic conﬂict, international peace, international co-operation,
the quality of democracy, party systems, human development and accountability.2 The
classical classiﬁcation also inﬂuences real-world constitutional design. In recent years, the
choice of presidentialism or parliamentarism – as debated in such terms – has occupied
a good deal of constitution makers’ attention in countries as diverse as Afghanistan,
Brazil, Kenya and Russia. In short, this is another case of the very close link between
classiﬁcation and explanation.3
We examine the proposition that the classical conceptualization entails a set of systemic
properties. If the variation in aspects of executive-legislative relations spans dimensions
that do not correlate with the classical distinction, it would behoove us to develop
alternative (or at least multidimensional) concepts. The ﬁrst step, however, is to evaluate
the coherence and predictability of the classical typology. A growing literature, including
what we might term the ‘varieties of presidentialism’ genre associated with Shugart and
Carey,4 suggests signiﬁcant heterogeneity within at least one of the types. New data that
we introduce below allow us to inspect the institutional conﬁguration of various
executive-legislative arrangements, historical and contemporary, both within and across
types. We look closely at design choices for each of six features of the constitutional
allocation of powers and authority between the executive and the legislature – features
thought to be associated with one or the other system. From a universe of 826 national
2 See Adesera`, Boix and Payne, 2003; Alvarez, 1997; Cheibub, 2007; Elman 2000; Foweraker and
Landman, 2002; Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno, 2005; Lijphart, Rogowski and Weaver, 1993; Linz 1994;
Minnich, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Saideman, et al. 2002; Samuels and Hellwig, 2007; Samuels
and Shugart, 2010; Shugart and Haggard, 2001.
3 Brady 2010.
4 Shugart and Carey 1992.
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constitutions written between 1789 and 2006, we evaluate a sample of 401 constitutions
considered to be presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential. We explore whether these
labels in fact capture homogenous institutional conﬁgurations by examining the similarity of
constitutions within and across categories. We ﬁnd an extraordinary amount of within-type
heterogeneity across the attributes in question. Indeed, knowing whether a constitution is
parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential is less helpful in predicting a constitution’s
executive-legislative structure (across these features, at least) than is knowing the geographic
region in which the constitution was produced, or when it was written.
Although within-type cohesion is low (at least by our expectations) for all three
categories, we ﬁnd measureable differences in the degree of cohesion across types, with
parliamentary constitutions standing out as the least cohesive of the three. Ironically, we
ﬁnd that semi-presidentialism – despite its seemingly hybrid nature – is more internally
coherent than the other categories, and that semi-presidential constitutions are equally
similar to parliamentary and presidential ones. The results of the measurement exercise
lead us to offer some guidance about the use of the classical typology and suggest a
research agenda for further conceptual exploration.
THE CLASSICAL TAXONOMY AND ITS BOUNDARIES
A telling entre´e into the challenges of conceptualizing executive-legislative relations is the
troubled concept of ‘semi-presidentialism’, a species of constitutions that now outnumbers
pure presidentialism by some counts.5 The category has deﬁed easy (or at least a consensual)
deﬁnition since Duverger ﬁrst described and labeled it.6 After reviewing the deﬁnitional
debate, Elgie has argued forcefully that the particular powers of presidents and prime
ministers should be excluded from the deﬁnition, and thus deﬁnes semi-presidentialism as a
system in which ‘a popularly elected ﬁxed-term president exists alongside a prime minister
and cabinet who are responsible to parliament’.7 This deﬁnition has an elegant simplicity and
seems to resonate with current usage. It focuses on the formal provisions of the constitution
and thus eliminates many (though not all) ambiguous cases associated with other deﬁnitions.
It also focuses on the critical question of the source of executive responsibility rather than the
relationship among executives, or even the total scope of executive power or independence.
One oft-voiced critique of Elgie’s deﬁnition (and Duverger’s formulation before it) is
that the semi-presidential category includes a wide range of disparate systems.8 The sense
is that the class is internally incoherent, at least compared with the supposedly purer types
of presidential and parliamentary systems. Elgie responds to this objection by pointing
out that the categories of presidentialism and parliamentarism, accepted by most
comparativists as foundational, themselves mask great internal variation.9 A more
damning critique of ‘semi-presidentialism’ is that one or more of the features that
distinguish the category (for example, direct elections for a ﬁxed-term president) may not
matter,10 perhaps because they do not predict other institutional traits. This issue of
5 See Almeida and Cho 2003; Cheibub 2007; Elgie 1999.
6 Duverger 1980. See also Elgie 1999; Shugart and Carey 1992.
7 Elgie 1999, 13.
8 Siaroff 2003.
9 Elgie 1999, 9–10. He goes further, following Shugart and Carey (1992), to categorize different
subtypes of semi-presidentialism, characterized by the relative weight of executive authority assigned to
the president and prime minister. See also Elgie 2005.
10 Cheibub and Chernykh 2009; Tavits 2009.
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institutional coherence within the classical categories is subject to empirical veriﬁcation
and helps to motivate our article.
In fact, a growing number of scholars has come to emphasize the diversity within
the ‘purebreds’ as well. Some of these contributions have, naturally, come in the wake of
Juan Linz’11 widely discussed claims about the perils of presidentialism for democratic
survival – claims that led scholars to dig more deeply into the meaning of the subtypes.
So, in their groundbreaking study, Shugart and Carey show that presidents wield a wider
range of powers than generally assumed.12 For example, some presidents have full control
of the hiring and ﬁring of the cabinet, whereas others do not; some have signiﬁcant
lawmaking powers (whether proactive or reactive), and others do not.13 Similarly,
another set of scholars has emphasized the diversity, which some see as growing, within
parliamentary systems. An example is the careful study by Poguntke and Webb on the
‘presidentialization’ of governments, in which the authors (and most of their contributors)
suggest that parliamentary governments in stable democracies have increasingly taken on
stereotypically ‘presidential’ characteristics with respect to power resources, autonomy,
and the degree of personalization. Importantly, Poguntke and Webb’s dimension of
partiﬁed versus presidentialized government is orthogonal – theoretically and empirically –
to the classic typology: all three types exhibit signiﬁcant variation along this dimension.14
This orthogonal quality is worth emphasizing, lest one conclude that the dimension
measures degrees of the category of ‘presidentialism’, which would only reinforce the
relevance of the classic dimension. Finally, Tsebelis’ focus on veto players suggests
another source of skepticism about the classic categories.15 His conceptualization is intended
to depart from the ‘institutional debates conducted in pairs’ (with presidentialism and
parliamentarism representing only one such pair) approach in favor of a dimension that cuts
through these classic lines of demarcation.16 Taken together, these three studies – Shugart and
Carey, Poguntke and Webb, and Tsebelis – leave one to wonder about how exhaustively the
classic categorization maps the contrast space in executive-legislative relations.
We posit that the classical typology implies a set of core deﬁning attributes as well
as a set of elective, incidental attributes. The research question turns on how elective,
exactly, this set of attributes is. The deﬁning distinction between presidentialism and
parliamentarism concerns the degree of dependence of the executive on the legislature,
speciﬁcally with respect to the selection and dismissal procedures of the executive.
Consider a representative formulation: ‘Parliamentarism is understood as a system of
government in which the executive is chosen by, and responsible to, an elective body (the
legislature), thus creating a single locus of sovereignty at the national level’.17 By contrast,
11 Linz 1994.
12 Shugart and Carey 1992.
13 See also Mainwairing and Shugart 1997.
14 Poguntke and Webb 2005, 6, notably Figure 1.1.
15 Tsebelis 2002.
16 Tsebelis 1995, 290.
17 Gerring, Thaker, and Moreno 2005, 571. For some scholars (for example, Stepan and Skach 1993),
what distinguishes parliamentarism from presidentialism is that the former is a system of mutual
dependence while the latter is one of mutual independence. Speciﬁcally, in parliamentary systems, not
only can the assembly remove the government, but the government can disband the assembly. This idea of
mutual dependence – at least the assembly’s dependence upon the executive – is not a core element of
standard deﬁnitions. One reason for the omission, as we shall see, is that the element is not unique to, or
universal among, constitutions that provide for an assembly-dependent executive.
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presidents – in Shugart and Carey’s terms – are distinguished by their separation from the
legislature with respect to their ‘origin’ (they are selected by direct elections) and ‘survival’
(they serve ﬁxed terms).
Presidentialism and parliamentarism are also considered to be systems of governance
and, in this sense, contain a number of less fundamental (but nonetheless important)
features that are supposed to hang together.18 As Moe and Caldwell put it:
when nations choose a presidential or parliamentary form, they are choosing a whole
system whose various properties arise endogenously – whether they like it or not – out of
the political dynamics that their adopted form sets in motion y Presidential and
parliamentary systems come with their own baggage. They are package deals.19
It is in part due to these presumably elective properties that broad characterizations of
these systems are possible and that cross-system performance varies. Thus, to cite only one
example, according to Tsebelis, ‘[i]n parliamentary systems the executive (government)
controls the agenda, and the legislature (parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in
presidential systems the legislature makes the proposal and the executive (the president) signs
or vetoes them’.20 This more encompassing understanding of parliamentarism and
presidentialism very likely derives in part from the makeup of prototypical cases such as
the United Kingdom and the United States, with the expectation that other cases in the class
exhibit some family resemblance. The ‘semi-presidentialist’ constitutions that have never quite
ﬁt represent either a discrete family or an intermediate ‘bastard’ tribe.21
One distinguishing elective characteristic is that, as the Tsebelis remark above suggests,
governments in parliamentary systems maintain tight control of the legislative agenda,
which perhaps follows from the idea that losing an important vote may imply their demise.
Since governments in presidential systems do not risk removal from power in the middle of
their term, they can afford to relinquish agenda-setting powers to the legislature. The Tsebelis
characterization (and conventional wisdom) also suggests that veto power – the mechanism
that allows presidents to react to the proposals initiated in the legislature – is typical of
presidential constitutions. Veto power is so closely associated with presidentialism that
Shugart and Carey even go so far as to incorporate it as a deﬁning attribute.22
On the other hand, parliamentary constitutions grant the head of state little or no
power to block legislation.23 Historically, these powers had been granted to monarchs; as
they evolved into ﬁgureheads of state (and as formal constitutions were adjusted to reﬂect
this fact), veto powers in parliamentary systems tended to fall into oblivion, to use von
Beyme’s phrase.24
18 Tsebelis 2002. See also Albert 2009, 2010.
19 Moe and Caldwell 1994, 172.
20 Tsebelis 1995, 325.
21 Elgie 1999, 7.
22 Shugart and Carey 1992, 19. See also Shugart and Haggard 2001, 67.
23 Von Beyme 2000, 122.
24 To the extent that the English ‘constitution’ represents the paradigmatic case of parliamentarism,
executive veto power is nowhere to be found. Bagehot recognized the absence of such power in the
following passage: ‘The popular theory of the English Constitution involves two errors as to the
sovereign. First, in its oldest form at least, it considers him as an ‘‘Estate of the Realm’’, a separate
co-ordinate authority with the House of Lords and the House of Commons. This and much else the
sovereign once was, but this he is no longer. That authority could only be exercised by a monarch with a
legislative veto. He should be able to reject bills, if not as the House of Commons rejects them, at least as
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Similarly, stylized accounts of presidentialism and parliamentarism suggest that presidents
wield unilateral control of the appointment and removal of cabinet members, while such
power is left to the assembly in parliamentary government (subject to a ratiﬁcation by
a ﬁgurehead of state). Part of the theory here is that the prime minister, as merely primus inter
pares, should not be vested with broad hierarchical power to organize the cabinet (which
would amount to a constrained choice, anyway, since the candidate list would be a subset of
her peers in the legislature). Semi-presidentialist constitutions – true to their nature – occupy
a middle ground in this respect: in some cases the appointment and dismissal of the cabinet
is the responsibility of the president, in others it is that of the assembly; in still others,
the responsibility is shared.25 It is indeed due to this ambiguity that many believe
semi-presidential constitutions are problematic.26 Presidential control over the ministry is
explicitly associated with presidentialism in many accounts, and Shugart and Carey even
elevate cabinet selection to a deﬁnitional attribute.27 Muller, Bergman and Strom consider the
idea of including ‘cabinet selection by the legislature’ as a deﬁning attribute of
parliamentarism and ultimately decide against doing so, reasoning – in part – that actual
practice among presumably ‘parliamentary’ systems exhibits substantial diversity with respect
to this trait.28
Regarding the important matter of the legislature’s oversight of the executive, it can be
argued that it should be considered to be primarily part of the system of checks and
balances that is often embedded in separation-of-powers constitutions. Parliamentary
constitutions, in turn, are structured in such a way as to maximize the convergence
between the interests of the government and those of the legislative majority;
consequently, provisions for legislative oversight of the executive would be redundant
in these constitutions.29 In semi-presidential constitutions, oversight is only required to
the extent that the executive is independent (as in contemporary Taiwan, for example,
where the appointment of the prime minister is not subject to parliamentary approval).
However, it is certainly the case that many parliamentary systems have a rigorous and
visible practice of interpellation (think ‘question time’ in the British House of Commons).
Indeed, Muller, Bergman and Strom list legislative control of the executive, through
means such as interpellation and ‘committees of inquiry’, as a hallmark of
parliamentarism.30
We ﬁnally come to the complex issues of emergency and executive decree powers, which
are intimately connected since the latter evolved and became formalized out of the
practice of the former. It was the declaration and maintenance of a state of siege or the
passing of full power laws by both warring and neutral powers during World War I that
led to, as Agamben puts it, ‘the extension of the executive’s powers into the legislative
(F’note continued)
the House of Peers rejects them. But the Queen has no such veto. She must sign her own death-warrant if
the two Houses unanimously sent it up to her’ (Bagehot 2009 [1867], 53).
25 Shugart and Carey 1992.
26 See Elgie (1999) for a discussion of critiques.
27 Shugart and Carey 1992, 19. The distance between presidentialism and parliamentarism may not be
enormous in this respect. Verney’s description of the prime minister’s power of appointment over the
ministry (Verney 1998[1958], 27) does not differ substantially from his description of the president’s
appointment power (45–6), even though his own intention is to draw just such a contrast.
28 Muller, Bergman, and Strom 2003, 11–12.
29 Von Beyme 2000, 81.
30 Muller, Bergman, and Strom 2003.
6 CHEIBUB, ELKINS AND GINSBURG
sphere through the issuance of decrees and measures’.31 While emergency powers are
more typically associated with presidential constitutions, decree powers – in particular the
scope of the permissible delegation of authority by parliament32 – have been more easily
justiﬁed in the context of parliamentary regimes, even though they have been a concern in
constitutions representing all regime types – parliamentary, presidential and semi-
presidential. The oft-heard refrain is that in parliamentary systems decree power is needed
in order to create a more muscular executive.
Thus emergency powers, which allow the executive to suspend the constitution for a
speciﬁc period of time when unusual circumstances occur, are commonly associated with
presidential constitutions. Ferejohn and Pasquino argue that constitutional systems based
on parliamentary sovereignty reject the ‘dualistic’ regime that emergency provisions
establish – that is, the notion that there exists a regular and an exceptional government. In
these systems, they say, ‘if there is a need to suspend rights or consolidate powers to deal
with an emergency, all this can be managed efﬁciently by the sovereign body itself –
normally the legislature (like in the British parliamentary system)’.33 Loveman, in turn,
argues that the uniquely strong emergency provisions of the nineteenth-century
presidential constitutions of Latin America were at the root of the region’s political
instability and militarization of politics (a charge sometimes repeated with regard to
Weimar semi-presidentialism).34
Executive decree powers, in turn, were justiﬁed in the European democracies of the
interwar period by the argument that the transfer of legislative authority to the executive
did not imply abdication, since parliament retained the power to withdraw conﬁdence
from the government and remove it from ofﬁce. In this sense, decree power was seen as
merely an issue of legal technique, changing parliamentary practice from ex ante to
ex post approval of government action.35 It is precisely because this justiﬁcation cannot be
extended to presidential constitutions that concerns about the abuse of decree powers by
presidents is so heightened in new democracies: granting legislative authority to the
executive in a system of separation of powers implies abdication, since the legislature has
no ex post mechanisms for controlling the actions taken by decree.36
The ancillary institutions that are said to characterize the three types of constitutions
sometimes play central roles in causal theory on the effects of the types. In fact, many
accounts of cross-system variation in important outcomes are focused on the presence or
absence of these very attributes. Thus, the tight control of the legislative agenda by the
government in parliamentary systems and the head of state’s veto in presidential systems
31 Agamben 2005, 7. Referring to the expression ‘full powers’, which is sometimes used to characterize
the state of exception, Agamben (2005) argues that it ‘refers to the expansion of the powers of the
government, and in particular the conferral on the executive of the power to issue decrees having the force
of law’.
32 Lindseth 2004.
33 Ferejohn and Pasquino 2006, 339.
34 See Linz 1994, 54; Loveman (1993) about presidential constitutions; Skach (2005) about Weimar
semi-presidentialism. Lindseth (2004, 1362–63) argues, however, that article 48 of the Weimar
constitution preserved ‘an important element of parliamentary legitimation’.
35 See Agamben 2005; Kirchheimer 1940, 1119.
36 See Carey and Shugart (1998) for a discussion of ‘delegation’ and ‘usurpation’ views of decree
powers in presidential democracies; see Pereira, Power, and Renno´ 2006; Power 1998; Ferreira, Rubio and
Goretti 1998. For analyses of decree usage in Argentina and Brazil, see Cheibub and Limongi (2011);
Huber (1996a) for a different interpretation of decree powers.
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is presumed to be at the root of their differences with respect to the probability of shifts in
policy from the status quo. The former attribute prevents the ‘separation of purpose’
between the executive and the legislature in parliamentary systems, thus reducing the
likelihood that partisan veto players will emerge; the latter ensures that presidential
systems will always have at least one more institutional veto player than do parliamentary
ones.37 As noted above, emergency powers thought to be disproportionally present in
presidential constitutions are said to have been at the root of the instability of Latin
American countries since the nineteenth century. Linz lists control over cabinets as one
of several ‘perils of presidentialism’. Finally, concerns about the dangers posed by
constitutional decree powers have been almost exclusively focused on presidential
systems, with much of this concern revolving around the notion that such powers lead to
the usurpation of legislative powers by the executive, with important consequences for
democracy and policy.
Thus a number of modular properties is thought to cohere in presidential and
parliamentary constitutions, and to account for differences in the performance of the
systems that adopt such constitutions. We are aware that some of these properties are less
widely associated with one speciﬁc type of constitution, and that some stereotypes may be
rooted in non-constitutional elements. This is particularly true of executive decree powers
and legislative oversight. The latter is a function that is often achieved via non-
constitutional means38 and that, some may argue, is unrelated to presidentialism and
parliamentarism. The prevalence of these stereotypes is, of course, an empirical question
in its own right. But no matter how widely held these stereotypes may be, they are all
central components of the relationship between executives and legislatures, and ones that
would be plausibly associated with its dominant conceptualization. In our view, the
question of whether or not these attributes cluster in predictable poles is important in and
of itself. After all, if these attributes are equally distributed across regime types, political
scientists will need to come to grips with a world that has more dimensions and contours
than they imagined – which would require rethinking concepts and causal theory.
We summarize these expectations in Table 1. Brieﬂy, parliamentary constitutions
should provide for strong executive control of the legislative agenda, weak executive veto,
relatively strong executive decree powers, relatively weak emergency provisions, relatively
weak involvement of the head of state in government formation and removal, and relatively
undeveloped oversight instruments. Presidential constitutions should be characterized by
weak executive control of the legislative agenda, strong veto powers, relatively weak decree
powers, strong emergency provisions, control of government formation and removal by the
president, and relatively well-developed oversight provisions. Finally, semi-presidential
constitutions, which occupy an intermediate category, presumably labor under fewer
stereotypes except – perhaps – with respect to their characteristically strong emergency
provisions. One also wonders about the relative cohesion of ‘semi-’ regimes. That is, do
these cases exhibit enough consistency in their design that we should think of them as
more than just intermediate cases or hybrids? Homogeneity of design would suggest a
regime type of its own, not simply a mongrel occupant of a residual category.
37 See Haggard and McCubbins (2001) for a discussion of ‘separation of purposes’ as contrasted with
‘separation of powers’. The Database of Political Institutions (see Beck et al. 2001) offers a count of the
number of institutional veto players; this variable has been widely used in empirical research on a variety
of topics.
38 See Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004.
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SOME EMPIRICAL REFERENCE POINTS
In spite of the theoretical coherence of parliamentary and presidential constitutions,
almost any real-world example of constitutional design seems to raise doubts about the
utility of these categories in predicting ancillary institutional attributes. Consider four
constitutional experiences drawn from diverse locales: Afghanistan, Ukraine, Australia
and Brazil.
Afghanistan
In 2003, the Constitutional Drafting Commission of Afghanistan sent its ﬁnal draft to the
president’s ofﬁce, after which it was to be forwarded to the constitutional Loya Jirga for
passage. The draft had been painstakingly constructed, with support from the United
Nations and others, and featured a parliamentary system, which many believed was the
best model to ensure representation for Afghanistan’s diverse population. When the draft
emerged from the president’s ofﬁce, however, the system had been changed to a
presidential one. But the constitution retained, whether intentionally or not, parliament’s
ability to vote ‘no conﬁdence’ in government ministers based on ‘well-founded reasons’
(though the text did not clearly spell out the implications of such a vote).39
Ukraine
In the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, constitutional amendments adopted overnight (and
in violation of constitutional norms) sought to engineer a compromise with the Kuchma
regime by recalibrating the powers of the president and parliament.40 This led to various
instabilities and the creation of a ‘parliamentary oligarchy’, as well as a new round of
TABLE 1 Presumed Attributes of Executive-Legislative Systems
System
Attribute Presidential Parliamentary Semi-presidential
Deﬁning attribute
Assembly conﬁdence No Yes For head of govt
Popularly elected head of state Yes No Yes
Elective attributes
Executive decree No Yes Depends
Emergency powers Strong Weak Strong
Initiation of legislation Legislature Executive Depends
Legislative oversight Yes No Depends
Executive veto Yes No Depends
Cabinet appointment Executive Legislature Depends
Other attributes
Assembly dissolution* No Yes Depends
*Assembly dissolution is considered by some to be a deﬁning attribute. Our principal analysis
does not treat this feature as such, although we do so in some robustness tests.
39 Constitution of Afghanistan, article 92. This led to a constitutional crisis in 2008 when the
parliament voted no conﬁdence in the foreign minister and the president sought to retain him.
40 See Kimitaka 2008.
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proposals to restructure the political system. Later proposals sought to extend
presidential power, allowing the executive to dissolve parliament and appoint the prime
minister if the parliament rejects the proposed candidate. Tensions over the allocation of
powers, however, led the government to fall in September 2008. In October 2010, the
Ukrainian constitutional court abruptly handed parliamentary powers of government
formation and dismissal back to the president, a development that is still unfolding as of
this writing. Ukraine seems to be a system swinging between extremes in an effort to ﬁnd a
workable semi-presidential model.
Australia
In 1975, the Australian governor general utilized, for the ﬁrst time and against constitutional
convention, his formal power to dismiss the prime minister after the government had lost the
conﬁdence of the upper house of parliament and failed to secure passage of the budget. Given
that the government enjoyed the conﬁdence of the lower house, many viewed this as a
violation of the norm in parliamentary systems. The debate over the constitutionality of the
action led one political scientist to characterize the Australian system as the ‘Washminster’
system, which was neither a variant of Westminster nor a pure presidential system.41
Brazil
A memorable photograph from the 1987–88 Brazilian Constitutional Assembly shows a
group of presidentialistas celebrating their come-from-behind victory in a highly contested
roll-call vote on the simple question of presidentialism or parliamentarism. Until that
critical juncture, many of the delegates had operated under the assumption that
parliamentarism, not presidentialism, would be the governing structure of the new system.
Thus, in constructing much of the constitutional structure, delegates operated with not
only an unclear sense of the basic relationship between powers, but also, most probably,
with a fundamentally distorted sense of this relationship. The 1988 constitution has
certainly induced a pattern of politics that is closer to what is observed in many
parliamentary countries than what unfolded, for instance, under the 1946 constitution.
Few people would contest the fact that under the 1988 Brazilian constitution the president
possesses powers that are often found in parliamentary systems, such as: control of the
legislative agenda, including the monopoly of some initiatives; the ability to request urgent
consideration of speciﬁc legislation; and, of course, decree powers. At the same time,
legislators face an incentive structure that does not really distinguish them from their
counterparts in the prototypical parliamentary systems, who are appropriately referred to as
backbenchers (or ‘low clergy’ in Brazil). It has been argued that the presence of such powers
allows for legislative outcomes in Brazil that are similar to the ones obtained in parliamentary
systems.42 The result is a political structure that has deﬁed all odds, at least the ones that were
dominant in the ﬁrst years of operation of the 1988 document.43
In each of these cases, category confusion played some role in constitutional design.
In each, the founders had either by design or omission failed to spell out key aspects of
41 See Thompson 1980.
42 This view, which today constitutes the accepted wisdom about Brazilian politics, originated in the
work of Figueiredo and Limongi, the most complete exposition of which can be found in Figueiredo and
Limongi 2000.
43 See Ames 2001; Kugelmas and Sola 1999; Mainwaring 1991; Sartori 1994.
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legislative-executive relations, or left untouched arrangements that were meant for a different
‘system’. And in each, the lacuna led to a constitutional crisis – or at least misunderstanding.
Brazil and Afghanistan are usually classiﬁed as having presidential systems; Australia is
typically considered parliamentary, and the Ukraine is considered semi-presidential. Yet
disputes have emerged between the head of state and parliament in each country, and
confusion remains about the scope of their respective powers. In short, the categories used
by political scientists have been adopted by constitutional designers, but the actual
provisions of texts frequently seem to deviate from the pure types, which sometimes leads
to constitutional confusion.
ANALYSIS
How internally cohesive are the classical categories? Our basic research strategy is to
analyze whether constitutions that fall into one of the three classes are in fact more similar
to one another with regard to key institutional attributes than they are to constitutions
outside their class.
Our method is to compare constitutions, contemporary and historical, with respect to
their division of power between the executive and legislature. Our data are from the
Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP), which is a comprehensive inventory of the
provisions of written constitutions for all independent states between 1789 and 2012.44
Collection of the data is ongoing; for purposes of this article, the dataset includes 632
systems, of the 826 constitutional systems identiﬁed by Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton.45
Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton include a large number of questions in their survey
instrument, many of which have to do with the powers of the executive and the legislature.
At the outset, we should make clear that our analysis is restricted to formal provisions
in written constitutional texts (we will refer to this as de jure constitutionalism). Actual
political practice in any country with regard to executive-legislative relations is certainly
more complicated than what is written into formal constitutional rules, and likely reﬂects
informal conventions as well as other sources of law such as judicial opinions. Nevertheless,
there are good reasons to focus on written texts. For one, formal constitutional rules
comprise a roughly comparable set of data to examine across time and space. By contrast,
examining unwritten constitutional rules raises signiﬁcant problems of identiﬁcation that are
likely insurmountable except in small samples. Secondly, formal texts reﬂect discrete acts of
constitutional designers, many of whom are informed by the classical typology. In this sense,
we can tie our analysis of institutional design to an identiﬁable activity and mode of behavior –
constitution making – and thereby keep the process in sight. Importantly, we know who did
what and when. Our analysis, then, can be seen as examining whether the provisions chosen by
constitution makers produce coherent systems that reﬂect the classical typology. We recognize,
though, that the implementation of these decisions may depart from written law.
We proceed in three broad stages. First, we utilize a set of variables from the CCP to
develop a tripartite categorization of government type based on the explicit provision of the
attributes that deﬁne these categories. We then consider each of six ‘elective’ attributes
44 See Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2010) for details on the conceptualization and measurement of
constitutions and constitutional systems. For the CCP, see www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.
45 A constitutional system consists of a constitution and all its amendments before the constitution is
formally suspended or replaced. We use only one event per system in this analysis, typically a new
constitution in the ﬁrst year of its adoption.
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individually and assess their association with one or the other government types. We next
develop a measure of institutional similarity between pairs of constitutions, based on items
representing these six attributes, and assess institutional coherence in a multivariate regression
model that speciﬁes other sources of similarity, notably regional and temporal proximity.
The Operationalization of Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and
Semi-presidentialism
Despite the centrality of the classical conceptualization, scholars have not settled on a
standard classiﬁcation scheme, and no one has apparently even attempted to do so for
constitutions in force prior to 1945. There are at least three published classiﬁcations of
countries for the post-war era.46 We choose to construct the classical classiﬁcation using the
CCP dataset, which has distinct advantages since its unit of analysis (the constitutional
system), its sample and its focus on de jure institutions provides consistency across the left-
and right-hand sides of the equation. We then evaluate the measure’s validity against the
alternative set of measures that are available for the subset of cases that match.
Our measure of the classical categorization scheme hinges on its deﬁning feature:
whether or not the government is collectively dependent on the legislature for survival.
This feature, as we describe above, is the crux of the distinction between presidentialism
and parliamentarism.47 If a government can be removed by the legislature for political
reasons (that is, removal is not restricted to criminal or behavioral misconduct), the case is
coded as parliamentary (n5 119);48 if not, it is coded as presidential so long as the head of
state is popularly elected, either directly or indirectly (n5 204). Semi-presidential systems
(n5 78) are those in which the government can be removed by the legislature and there is
a popularly elected head of state. A large set of excluded cases (n5 230) contains
constitutions whose provisions do not formally deﬁne these powers, such as constitutional
monarchies in which assembly conﬁdence in the government is not explicit (for example,
the Netherlands 1848, Norway 1814 and Canada 1867) or seemingly presidential systems
in which the president is not popularly elected (for example, Brazil’s 1937 constitution).49
A plot of the population within each class over time (Figure 1) provides a better sense of
the universe of cases and documents the well-known increase in the number of semi-
presidential systems in recent decades.
How does this classiﬁcation match those produced by other scholars? And, for that
matter, how do these other measures compare to each other? As one rough indication, we
calculate the percentage of cases (constitutional systems) for which any two classiﬁcations
agree. For the three comparisons with our measure, we ﬁnd that Beck et al.’s classiﬁcation
matches 51 per cent of ours, Norris’ classiﬁcation matches 68 per cent and Cheibub’s
matches 94 per cent. Overall, Cheibub’s measure (which was produced for another
46 Beck et al. 2001; Cheibub 2007; Norris 2009.
47 See Cheibub 2007.
48 In this sense, cases in which governments and ministers are responsible for their acts only criminally
are not coded as parliamentary. Many constitutions, mostly in European monarchies of the nineteenth
century, state that ‘ministers are responsible’, leaving unspeciﬁed to whom, in which way and with what
consequences. Such cases are not considered to be instances of assembly conﬁdence for our purposes. This
reﬂects the fact that the formal description of assembly conﬁdence in written constitutions arose rather
late, and was implicit rather than explicit in early parliamentary constitutions.
49 Excluding the 162 unclassiﬁable cases yields a sample of 401 constitutional systems. See the online
appendix for the coding of the regime variable.
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theoretical purpose unrelated to the present inquiry) exhibits the highest degree of
intercorrelation, with a mean matching score of 78 per cent, while the Beck et al. and
Norris measures exhibit scores of 51 per cent and 64 per cent, respectively.50 One
inference from these numbers is that scholars’ understanding of presidentialism and
parliamentarism may not be as consensual as one would expect. In fact, a major source of
divergence has to do with how the scholars decide to treat intermediate cases. Beck et al.,
for example, appear to push cases toward one of the pure types (presidentialism or
parliamentarism) and to avoid a designation of semi-presidentialism.
It is instructive to compare our classiﬁcation more closely with the Cheibub measure,
which exhibits the highest correspondence across datasets and therefore may be the
closest thing to a standard measure in the ﬁeld. Cheibub’s classiﬁcation is available for a
smaller set of cases (democratic constitutions since 1945) than that derived from the CCP,
whose sample includes all written constitutions since 1789. For the 129 constitutions for
which the two measures overlap, 117 fall into the same category, suggesting substantial
similarity between the two measurement approaches. Not surprisingly, the difference
between the classiﬁcations stems from the treatment of the intermediate category. Nine of
the twelve cases over which the measures disagree are ones that we have coded as semi-
presidential and Cheibub has coded as either presidential (4) or parliamentary (5).
How Elective are the Elective Attributes?
Do we observe coherence in the distribution of the ancillary properties listed in Table 1?
Table 2 calculates the proportion of constitutions that have each of these properties
across all constitutions, as well as for those constitutions written before and after World
War II. We should note that these proportions necessarily mask a fair degree of variation.
Certainly, powers can be qualiﬁed and restricted in a number of important ways. In other
analyses (not shown), we construct a more nuanced measure of these powers; we also
evaluate a broader set of powers, such as amendment proposal, budgetary powers, war
powers and immunity provisions for either branch.
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Fig. 1. Number of constitutions by government type (1920–2006)
50 See Footnote 24.
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TABLE 2 Percent of Constitutions with Selected Provisions, by de jure Government Type and Era
1789–1945 1946–2006
Presidential Parliamentary Semi-presidential Total Presidential Parliamentary Semi-presidential Total
Executive has veto power 80 80 100 81 87 63 82 77
Executive has decree power 73 67 71 72 66 48 72 61
Executive has emergency powers 87 73 71 84 95 86 97 92
Executive initiates legislation 58 80 86 63 72 54 89 70
Legislature has oversight powers 87 80 86 86 84 49 76 70
Executive appoints cabinet 93 87 86 92 92 95 96 94
Number of constitutions 86 15 7 108 117 104 72 293
Source: Comparative Constitutions Project.
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Substantively, these latter approaches deliver roughly equivalent results, and so we
focus here on the core set of six powers, in their aggregate form. The list of cases before
World War II is limited due not only to our more limited sample prior to that time, but
also because of the relative silence in early parliamentary constitutions with respect to
executive-legislative relations. Because parliamentarism emerged as an evolutionary
process characterized by a ‘gradual devolution of power from monarchs to parliaments’,51
governmental practice often did not require codiﬁcation. Rather, executive-legislative
relations in these early cases were regulated through informal norms and understandings.
By contrast, presidentialism and written constitutionalism were born together with the
ratiﬁcation of the US constitution in 1789, a form adopted by the newly independent
republics of Latin America. It seems logical that this more engineered form of government
would require the introduction of formal provisions that regulate the interaction of the
executive and the legislature earlier than would parliamentary systems.
When comparing executive and legislative attributes across constitutions, problems of
comparability arise due to differences in the structure of ofﬁces. How does one measure
whether ‘the executive’ has, say, veto power when executive power is divided into two
ofﬁces, as in semi-presidential systems? And how should we compare two systems with a
different number of executives with respect to such powers? One could follow one of three
strategies: (1) focus on only one ofﬁce (for example, head of government) and ignore the
second ofﬁce in dual-executive systems; (2) treat single-executive systems as if there were
two ofﬁces, vesting the same power in each ofﬁce, for purposes of comparing to dual-
executive systems; or (3) use the executive branch as the unit of analysis, and assume that
ofﬁces are partners (that is, if either ofﬁce in a dual-executive system has a power, then the
entire branch has the power). Each of these strategies introduces error, and it is not
entirely obvious a priori which way to proceed. Since our goal is to examine the
distribution of powers across branches, and not whether these branches function in
harmony or not, we lean toward the third approach and have assessed constitutions
accordingly in this study.52 In a set of robustness checks summarized below, we evaluate
the impact of the alternative measurement strategies.
We thus analyze six elective attributes of executive-legislative relations: executive veto,
executive decree, emergency, executive initiative of legislation, legislative oversight and
cabinet appointment. We describe each of these powers in turn.
Executive veto. Executive veto powers originate with the US constitution and are seen as
a quintessential characteristic of presidential systems. Yet well over half of our
constitutions have some sort of executive approval of legislation, and many have a
veto, even if it can be overridden or involves only delay. Contrary to what one would
51 Przeworski 2012, 545; see also Lauvaux 1988; Von Beyme 2000.
52 It could be argued that some powers have different purposes across the constitutional types. For
example, veto power in assembly conﬁdence regimes (that is, in semi-presidential democracies) might be
said to represent an additional check on the power of the effective head of government, the prime
minister. In a presidential regime, it is an instrument of the head of government that can be deployed
against a legislative majority. Further consideration, however, shows that this is not the case. Veto power
is always a check by the executive on a legislative majority. The difference is that in semi-presidential
systems, the executive can be divided in the sense that, while the head of government is supported by a
legislative majority, the head of state is not. In these systems, the head of state is granted veto power,
which is, like in presidential systems, deployed against a legislative majority. We thank an anonymous
referee for forcing us to clarify this issue.
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expect, not only do a signiﬁcant number of parliamentary constitutions contain veto
provisions, but in the period prior to 1945 they were as likely to grant veto power to the
executive as were presidential ones. All of the parliamentary constitutions with executive
veto power, however, were written in the 1920s; they include Czechoslovakia (1920), Poland
(1921), and Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania (1922). All of these documents allow the head of
state (the monarch, the governor-general or the president chosen by parliament) to send a bill
back for reconsideration by the legislature; often a supermajority is required for passage of a
rejected bill. Occasionally, the head of state is allowed to submit the matter to a public
referendum if he or she remains unhappy with the law.
Vetoes are also found, unsurprisingly, in semi-presidential constitutions. The Weimar
constitution allowed the president to refer a bill to a plebiscite if he refused to sign it.
The French constitution of 1958 had a more complex scheme, including the constitutional
council as another veto player. The constitutions that emerged after the fall of communism
generally include some provision for executive veto as well. Indeed, the content of semi-
presidential constitutions has become very similar to that of presidential constitutions with
respect to veto provisions.
Thus, although they originated in a presidential constitution, veto provisions are hardly
absent in parliamentary and semi-presidential documents. As a matter of fact, they were
incorporated into parliamentary constitutions in the 1920s and existed even in the ﬁrst semi-
presidential constitutions.
Executive decree. Executive decree power is somewhat anomalous because it precedes,
historically at least, the existence of independent legislatures. It can be found in
monarchic (but not parliamentary in our sense) constitutions such as those of 1889 Meiji
Japan and the 1876 Ottoman empire, as well as in early Latin American constitutions, like
those of Haiti (1805) and Mexico (1822). About three-fourths of the pre-1945 presidential
constitutions, and two-thirds of the parliamentary and semi-presidential ones, contained
executive decree provisions. With the exception of semi-presidential cases, post-1945
constitutions were less likely to contain executive decree provisions. Here the empirical
record contradicts the widespread perception that recent constitutions, particularly pure
presidential ones, are more likely to contain decree provisions.53
Emergency. Emergency provisions were late to appear in parliamentary constitutions, at
least in those that were actually implemented. Loveman was correct that early Latin
American countries introduced emergency provisions into their constitutions, and that
this distinguished presidential and parliamentary constitutions in the nineteenth
century:54 between 1800 and 1899, there were only two countries with parliamentary
constitutions that contained emergency provisions (the Netherlands and Prussia); during
the same time, there were ten such cases of presidential constitutions, nine of which hailed
from Latin America (Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Bolivia, Mexico,
Guatemala, Haiti and, outside of the region, France in 1852). But this distinction between
the two systems with regard to emergency provisions is no longer as apparent. After a
sharp decline in the appearance of new constitutions containing emergency provisions in
presidential systems, and an increase in the number of such provisions in parliamentary
ones, the gap is smaller now and the three types of constitutions seem to evolve in tandem
53 Carey and Shugart 1998.
54 Loveman 1993.
16 CHEIBUB, ELKINS AND GINSBURG
(with a period during the 1980s when the gap between presidential and parliamentary
constitutions widened).
The thrust of early constitutional regulation of emergency powers was to assign the
legislature some type of oversight role. A common theme was to restrict presidential
authority to instances in which the legislature was not in session. But today there does not
really seem to be a correlation across government types in the assignment of powers.
In South Africa (1996) the legislature is the default regulator. This is shared by
presidential Estonia (that is, Estonia under the 1920 constitution). In semi-presidential
constitutions, the power is often shared between the government and the legislature, as in
Slovenia’s constitution of 1991, in which the legislature declares the state of emergency on
the proposal of government, or the Bulgarian model of 1991 in which either the president
or prime minister can declare a state of emergency. In short, one sees no real correlation
with government type.
Legislative initiation. Legislative initiative has traditionally been considered the domain
of parliamentary governments. In order to navigate the hazards of legislative conﬁdence,
the executive is granted the power to introduce important bills and therefore shape the
legislative agenda. As a matter of fact, in many parliamentary constitutions this power
goes beyond simple legislative initiative to include the power to force the end of legislative
debates, to impose a yes/no vote and to tie the outcome of a vote to the survival of
the government.55
Our data show that the conventional wisdom is incorrect, at least for the post-1945
period. If, prior to this date, governments were granted legislative initiative when they
depended on legislative conﬁdence in order to survive (in parliamentary and semi-
presidential constitutions), the same is not true for charters written after 1945. In recent
constitutions, presidential systems are more likely than are pure parliamentary ones to
allow the government to initiate legislation. When considered together (parliamentary
plus semi-presidential), constitutions under which governments depend on assembly
conﬁdence are as likely as presidential ones to grant the government legislative initiative.
Thus, executives in presidential constitutions are far from being powerless when it comes
to initiating legislation. Even since the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century, presidential
constitutions have, on average, contained at least one of four areas of initiative: ordinary
laws, the budget, referendum and constitutional amendment. In some cases, such as in
Chile and Brazil, the president holds the exclusive power to initiate the budget bill.56
Legislative oversight. We observe a similar phenomenon with respect to legislative oversight.
One would expect provisions for legislative oversight to be weaker in parliamentary
constitutions due to the control the legislature already exerts over the government via the
conﬁdence mechanism. For this reason, parliamentary constitutions would contain fewer
provisions for legislative oversight, such as the requirement that the government report to the
legislature periodically or that the legislature be allowed to investigate the government.
The CCP survey asks whether the executive must appear in parliament at regular intervals,
whether the parliament can interpellate the executive at will and whether the legislature is
empowered to investigate the executive. We interpret the existence of any one of these
provisions as constituting legislative oversight. Table 2 suggests that presidential constitutions
55 See Do¨ring 1996; Huber 1996b; Lauvaux 1988.
56 See Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) on Brazil; Siavelis (2000) on Chile.
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tend to contain such oversight provisions more frequently than either parliamentary or semi-
presidential constitutions (despite the fact that all six semi-presidential constitutions that existed
prior to 1945 stipulated legislative oversight). The difference, however, is relatively small,
particularly if we compare constitutions that require legislative conﬁdence in order for the
government to survive (parliamentary and semi-presidential) with those that do not. When we
do so, the post-1945 difference is only 14 percentage points, suggesting that constitution makers
were not convinced that assembly conﬁdence would represent a sufﬁcient instrument of
legislative oversight of the executive.
Cabinet appointment. Another characteristic of presidential systems is the power to
appoint the cabinet. Indeed, our data indicate that this power is quite close to the core of
the presidential system; it is found in 92 per cent of post-war presidential constitutions.
Typically, this power is at the president’s discretion and there is little tradition of
collective responsibility of the cabinet in presidential systems. The power originates with
the US constitution of 1789, and is evident throughout the nineteenth century in many
Latin American constitutions. Nevertheless, executives in parliamentary and semi-
presidential constitutions also have this power, at least in the post-war era. One might
think of this power as an executive prerogative common to nearly all constitutions.
We are aware that there is no universally agreed upon set of criteria to justify the choice
of these six attributes of legislative-executive relations. Yet, we believe there are two main
factors supporting our choice. First, apart from the elements that are used to deﬁne the
types of constitution (assembly conﬁdence and popular presidential elections), the
attributes we chose are the ones that are most centrally discussed in the literature on
executive-legislative relations.
Secondly, our choice was buttressed by the fact that the six elements we selected overlap
considerably with the attributes of presidential powers used by Shugart and Carey;
Metcalf; and Siaroff, three of the widely employed rules for examining presidential
powers.57 Shugart and Carey list nine legislative and non-legislative powers of presidents,
ﬁve of which (veto, decree, legislative initiative, cabinet formation and cabinet dismissal)
are part of our six (with cabinet formation and dismissal conﬂated into one in our case).
One of these powers (assembly removal of cabinet, or censure) is a deﬁning trait of the
constitutional types, dissolution is something we consider in the robustness section, and
budgetary powers are (in some sense) subsumed under legislative initiative (we are, at
least, able to detect cases in which the executive has no budget initiative, but cannot detect
those in which the initiative is exclusive). Thus the only power that they cover and we do
not is the executive’s referendum initiative, which has little intuitive connection with
regime types. Metcalf’s analysis is almost identical to Shugart and Carey’s. She adds
‘judicial review’, which we believe does not belong in a set of attributes of executive-
legislative relations.
Finally, Siaroff considers nine attributes: one (popular election of head of state) is a
deﬁning feature of constitutional type in our analysis; four are similar to the ones we use
(discretionary appointment power, central role in government formation, veto and
emergency/decree powers); one is assembly dissolution, which we consider later; one
(concurrent presidential and legislative elections) does not strictly belong in a list of
powers; one is incidental to some of the powers already captured (whether the head of
state chairs cabinet meetings); and the last (a central role in foreign policy), if properly
57 See Metcalf 2000; Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003.
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coded, would be present in all constitutions since they all denote the head of state as the
actor who represents the nation and therefore deals with representatives of other nations.
An Aggregate Assessment of Similarity in Executive-Legislative Provisions
The distribution of the constitutional attributes in Table 2 suggests that the classical
conceptualization is less than systemic. In this section, we assess the degree of coherence
in a more aggregate fashion and control for other inﬂuences on constitutional design.
Analytically, one can approach this question using a variety of methods. Here we develop
a measure of the similarity between any two constitutions (in the year of their entry into
force) based on the set of elective attributes in Table 1 and, essentially, test the predictive
power of the classical typology. Our measure of similarity is straightforward. It calculates
the percent of the binary provisions in Table 1 along which any two documents agree.
Consider, for example, the dyad composed by the Brazilian constitution of 1988 and the
US constitution of 1787. These two constitutions share three of six provisions (all but
decree, emergency provisions and the initiation of legislation), thus resulting in a
similarity score of 0.50. By contrast, the Brazilian constitution of 1891, patterned more
closely after the US model, shares ﬁve of six provisions with the US document (matching
everything except decree) for a similarity score of 0.83.
For the 401 total constitutions for which we were able to measure government type, the
number of bilateral comparisons is therefore 80,200 [(401*4012401)/2]. Across these
dyads the mean similarity score is 0.68. About 14 per cent of pairs of constitutions (11,801
pairs) share all six provisions for a score of 1.00. Fifty-six per cent of these perfectly
matched pairs are composed of two constitutions with different government types, which
suggests a fair degree of hybridity with respect to the elective attributes in question.
A small number of dyads (486) shares none of the six attributes. Of these polar opposites,
roughly 55 per cent are from the same ‘system’, again suggesting that the classical
conceptualization is less than systematic. So, for example, the constitutions of Burundi
(1981) and Benin (1979) – both presidential – enumerate entirely different provisions with
respect to these six attributes. The same holds for the Czech Republic (1993) and South
Africa (1993), two assembly conﬁdence constitutions whose ‘systemic’ attributes do not
match in any respect.
Congruence of Constitutional Provisions within and across Classes
We can begin to get a sense of the degree to which any two presidential, parliamentary or
semi-presidential constitutions share a distinct institutional proﬁle by observing the mean
similarity scores within and across categories. Table 3 reports this set of comparisons.
If attributes of executive-legislative relations cohere within the classical categories, then
we should see high within-class scores and low across-class scores, relative to the overall
mean. Two of the three diagonal elements (presidentialism and semi-presidentialism)
exhibit this pattern, as does one of the three off-diagonal elements (semi-presidential-
presidential). This is a mixed pattern, to be sure. While presidentialism (and especially
semi-presidentialism) shows some degree of within-class homogeneity, parliamentarism
does not. From these data at least, it appears that the classic conceptualization has, at
best, only modest power to predict the package of legislative and executive powers.
The bivariate ﬁndings are intriguing and suggest at least two avenues for further
inquiry. First, are these patterns stable over time? Secondly, how does the predictive
ability of the system classiﬁcation with respect to pairwise similarity (shown to be quite
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modest above) compare to that of other explanatory factors associated with differences
among states or constitutions? We evaluate these two questions with a set of multivariate
models that regresses the similarity between any two constitutions, a and b, on a set of
shared characteristics between the two. That is:
yab5 b01Xab1 e;
where y is the measure of similarity between constitutions a and b, X is a vector of
attributes describing the relationship between a and b, and e is an error term. X includes
measures of the following relationships between the two constitutions in a dyad:
(1) Same region. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the two constitutions are from countries
in the same geographic region.
(2) Same system. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the two constitutions are either both
presidential, both parliamentary or both semi-presidential as deﬁned by the variable
constructed from the CCP data described above. In some analyses, this variable is
broken out into dummy variables representing ﬁve of the six combinations of pairs
(with parliamentary-semi-presidential as the residual category).
(3) Year difference (in 100s). The absolute value of the difference in the year of
promulgation between two constitutions, divided by 100.
(4) Same country. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the two constitutions are from the same
country, since most countries have at least two historical constitutions in our sample.
We begin with a model run on 80,200 dyads in the sample for which we have valid data.
Since we are concerned about the independence of observations in which individual
constitutions are included in multiple pairings, in separate analyses we test an adapted
ﬁxed-effects model in which we explain variation within the ﬁrst member of the dyad
(by entering a dummy variable for each ﬁrst member) and estimate standard errors
clustered within the ﬁrst member of these dyads. As it happens, the estimates are nearly
identical to those from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which we present here.
Table 4 presents the OLS estimates for the full sample and those for two eras, pre- and
post-World War II. For each of these three samples we test two different speciﬁcations of
the model. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes a binary variable that indicates whether two
constitutions are from the same system (regardless of which) and the second set includes
three binary variables indicating that the two constitutions are both presidential, both
TABLE 3 Similarity of Constitutional Dyads within and across Categories of
Government Type
Constitution B
Constitution A Parliamentary Presidential Semi-presidential
Parliamentary 0.61*
(7,021)
Presidential 0.64* 0.72
(24,157) (20,503)
Semi-presidential 0.65 0.73* 0.76*
(9,401) (16,037) (3,081)
*Signiﬁcantly different from the overall mean at 5 per cent.
Note: cells represent mean similarity with number of dyads in parentheses.
Overall mean5 0.68 (80,200 dyads), standard deviation5 0.22
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parliamentary or both semi-presidential (the residual category thus includes all cross-class
pairs). The estimates from the full sample (Table 4, Columns 1 and 4) conﬁrm the
bivariate results reported above. The same-system variable in Column 1 suggests that
within-class constitutions are indeed more similar to one another than are cross-class
constitutions (although by only about two points, b5 0.020). The coefﬁcients on the
within-class variables in Column 4 suggest the same mixed pattern that we noticed in
Table 3. While presidential and semi-presidential pairs show a modicum of similarity
(b5 0.045 and 0.079, respectively), parliamentary systems are actually less alike (b520.066)
than the cross-class dyads.
Table 4 provides some sense of how these patterns have changed over time. The models
in Columns 2 and 4 restrict the cases to those in which both constitutions were written
prior to 1945, and the models in Columns 3 and 6 to those in which both were written
after 1945. (This means, of course, that we are excluding the pairs that were written in
different eras). Overall, it appears that modern constitutions exhibit more within-class
cohesion than pre-WWII ones. The coefﬁcient on the same-system variable is strongly
negative for pre-WWII cases (b520.074) and modestly positive for post-WWII cases
(b5 0.023). Moreover, it appears that much of this reversal can be attributed to growing
cohesion among presidential constitutions. The effects in Models 5 and 6 suggest that,
although parliamentary constitutions have become more homogeneous in the post-war
period, they are still quite dissimilar: when it comes to executive-legislative properties, two
modern parliamentary constitutions are still more dissimilar than two constitutions
belonging to two different types.
It is important to note that our analysis involves constitutional documents, regardless
of their degree of enforcement. Parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-parliamentarism,
TABLE 4 Explaining the Similarity of Executive-Legislative Elective Properties, by
Era (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1789–2006 Pre-1945 Post-1944 1789–2006 Pre-1945 Post-1944
Same country 0.103** 0.118** 0.126** 0.100** 0.118** 0.130**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013)
Difference in birth year (100’s) 20.029** 20.113** 0.008 20.039** 20.114** 0.011
(0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007)
Same region 0.032** 0.119** 0.022** 0.019** 0.117** 0.011**
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
Same system 0.020** 20.074** 0.023**
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Both presidential 0.045** 20.071** 0.060**
(0.002) (0.009) (0.003)
Both semi-presidential 0.079** 20.045 0.095**
(0.004) (0.047) (0.004)
Both parliamentary 20.066** 20.101** 20.056**
(0.003) (0.022) (0.003)
Constant 0.676** 0.715** 0.663** 0.683** 0.716** 0.665**
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002)
Observations 80,200 5,778 42,778 80,200 5,778 42,778
R-squared 0.015 0.092 0.008 0.034 0.092 0.036
Note: dyads composed of national constitutions promulgated between 1789 and 2006.
Standard errors in parentheses; **signiﬁcant at 1 per cent.
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however, are labels often applied to democratic forms of government. It is natural to wonder
if the same results would be obtained if we restricted our analysis to documents that govern
democratic regimes.
Of course, identifying the ‘democratic’ documents is not as straightforward as it may
appear. Our solution consisted of using the Cheibub (2007) database to identify forms of
democratic government, and matching the CCP constitutional documents to them. This
procedure, however, generated a dataset with signiﬁcant differences with respect to the data
analyzed in the body of the article. For example, some constitutions found in the
‘democratic’ sample were excluded from our analysis because they neither had an assembly
conﬁdence proviso nor called for popular presidential elections. The reason for this is that,
although the constitution had been written prior to the period covered by the Cheibub
dataset, it was in force in systems that were democratic after 1945. Examples include Belgium
1831, Canada 1867, Colombia 1886, Cuba 1940, Luxembourg 1868, Netherlands 1848,
Sweden 1809, Switzerland 1899 and Norway 1814. Moreover, the sample gets considerably
reduced when we adopt this procedure. For the pre-1945 period, there are 55 dyads available
for comparison (as opposed to 5,778 using only the CCP data); for the post-1945 period,
there are 3,916 dyads in the sample (down from 42,778 when only the CCP data are used).
Table 5, Columns 1 and 2, reports the ﬁndings for a set of constitutions governing
democratic regimes in the post-1945 period, whether or not they were written under these
regimes. Qualitatively, the results are the same as reported before: two constitutions that
regulate the same type of democracy are more likely to be similar when it comes to
executive-legislative relations than two constitutions that regulate different types of
democracy. However, regime type is not the biggest inﬂuence on the constitutional
conﬁguration. Other factors include the era and region in which the constitution was
TABLE 5 Explaining the Similarity of Executive-Legislative Elective Properties in
Democratic Regimes, by era (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1946–2006 1946–2006 1974–2006 1974–2006 Post-1989 Post-1989
Same country 0.161** 0.115** 0.141* 0.086 0.075 0.125*
(0.044) (0.008) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Difference in birth year (100’s) 20.193** 20.188** 20.982** 20.909** 0.486* 0.571**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.069) (0.068) (0.214) (0.212)
Same region 0.036** 0.011 0.017 0.004 0.007 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Same system 0.039** 0.047** 0.024
(0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
Both presidential 0.142** 0.113** 20.040
(0.012) (0.016) (0.021)
Both semi-presidential 0.180** 0.141** 0.062**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Both parliamentary 20.029** 20.049** 20.070*
(0.008) (0.013) (0.034)
Constant 0.693** 0.696** 0.781** 0.775** 0.785** 0.782**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 3,916 3,916 1,830 1,830 666 666
R-squared 0.039 0.098 0.135 0.187 0.017 0.057
Note: dyads composed of national constitutions in democracies between 1946 and 2006.
Standard errors in parentheses; **signiﬁcant at 1 per cent; *signiﬁcant at 5 per cent.
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written, and, most importantly, the country: as before, the best predictors of how a
constitution regulates executive-legislative relations are the other constitutions written in
that country. As before, we also ﬁnd that the constitutions of two presidential and semi-
presidential democracies are more likely to be similar than those of democratic pairs with
different systems, and that constitutions in parliamentary democracies are less likely to be
similar than those of disparate pairs. The magnitude of the similarity of pairs of
presidential and semi-presidential democracies is considerably higher: 0.142 (as opposed
to 0.045) for presidentialism and 0.180 (as opposed to 0.079) for semi-presidentialism.
This, however, should not be interpreted as an indication that presidential and semi-
presidential democratic regimes are becoming more ‘consistent’ in matching their
constitutions with ancillary provisions for executive-legislative relations. Columns 3 and 4
of Table 5 show that coefﬁcients do not increase for dyads of presidential and semi-
presidential constitutions written in the democracies that emerged since 1974. Columns 5
and 6 show that the effect of system similarity virtually disappears, and presidential dyads
become more dissimilar, in constitutions written after the fall of communism.
To summarize, we draw two key insights from these ﬁndings. First, the classical
conceptualization scheme exhibits relatively little institutional cohesion. To some degree,
this overall effect masks a degree of internal homogeneity within the presidential and
semi-presidential classes. Secondly, this lack of cohesion appears to have declined over
time among presidential constitutions but increased among parliamentary ones. This
latter ﬁnding is somewhat surprising given that, according to conventional wisdom, early
parliamentary constitutions rarely codiﬁed their legislative-executive relations. The post-
war parliamentary constitutions, it seems, have evolved away from classical models.
It is revealing to compare the institutional similarity predicted by the classic typology
with other non-institutional predictors. As Table 4 shows, the other characteristics of
pairs in the model (same region, same country and same era) all had effects in the
direction we would expect: pairs of constitutions written in the same era, the same country
and in the same geographic area tend to be more similar than those that were written in
different eras, countries or geographic regions. Moreover, all of these effects are, in terms
of magnitude, stronger than the effect of government type, at least the aggregate measure
that we utilize. So, based on Model 1 of Table 4, we estimate that, on average,
constitutions from the same region are 3 percentage points more similar, those from the
same country ten points more similar and those separated by 100 years are three points
less similar. Knowing the century or the region in which the constitutions were written allows
one to predict the similarity of their institutional attributes better than one could by knowing
only that they are of the same system type. This is our principal and, we believe, somewhat
unsettling ﬁnding for those of us who have come to rely upon – and teach – the classical
conceptualization of regime types.
Robustness
Are these ﬁndings robust to alternative methods? For the most part they are, although
some alternative methods and conditions yield increased predictive power for the classical
conceptualization. Consider ﬁrst our measure of the dependent variable. In its
construction we faced a decision about how to treat the comparison of systems with
different numbers of executives. Given the choice of comparing only the head of
government across systems, comparing across two ofﬁces by creating twin powers in
single-executive systems or collapsing dual-executive systems into one by aggregating the
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powers of the two ofﬁces, we chose the last. The ﬁrst alternative has the disadvantage of
ignoring an entire ofﬁce, and the second alternative introduces a degree of similarity
across systems based purely on a structural attribute (the number of executives) that is
perfectly correlated with the classical classiﬁcation, thus artiﬁcially inﬂating the
correlation between the system classiﬁcation and institutional similarity. Nevertheless,
we tested our models with dependent variables constructed with these alternative
methods. The results suggest stronger effects for the system variable (the coefﬁcient on the
same system variable for models equivalent to Model 1 in Table 4 is b5 0.08 and b5 0.09
for the two alternative methods, respectively). These estimates would suggest signiﬁcantly
stronger predictive power for the classic categorization, though clearly some of that
power is an artifact of measurement strategies correlated with the dependent variable.
We also wondered how well the classic conceptualization would predict an expanded set
of features of executive-legislative relations. Recall that, in the CCP, we have at our
disposal a fairly comprehensive dataset of the powers of (and constraints on) executives
and legislatures. We therefore developed a measure of similarity based on the six
attributes plus an expanded set of features by including provisions regarding the
executive’s power to propose budgets, executive immunity, legislative immunity, executive
power to propose amendments, executive power to pardon and a bicameral legislature.
Models run on this expanded similarity measure returned estimates for the same-system
coefﬁcient that were, if anything, smaller than that based on the original six features (for
example, b5 0.015 for the model equivalent to Column 1). In some ways this ﬁnding is
not surprising, since the items in this expanded set are not necessarily suspected of being
elective attributes of presidentialism and parliamentarism. Nonetheless, the expanded
items are core attributes of executives and legislatures, with important effects on the
relationship between the two branches, and it is noteworthy that they too are unrelated to
the classical distinction.
Finally, since we found that six allegedly elective attributes were unrelated to
presidentialism and parliamentarism, we were led to investigate the relationship between the
classiﬁcation and provisions for assembly dissolution, a feature that is so well associated with
parliamentarism that some even include it as part of the concept’s deﬁnition.58 Yet, even with
respect to this quasi-deﬁnitional feature we found heterogeneity across class. Since 1789, a not
unsubstantial percentage of the 204 presidential constitutions in our sample (22 per cent) has
included assembly dissolution, while a considerable minority of parliamentary constitutions
(20 per cent) does not do so. Certainly, this sort of distribution across classes suggests that
the feature is indeed more common to parliamentary systems, but the feature seems hardly
deﬁnitional. That it is not exclusive to, and universal among, parliamentary systems only
emphasizes the hybridity within the classical categories. Curiously, a full 87 per cent of
semi-presidential constitutions provides for assembly dissolution, a level that is consistent
with our prior ﬁnding of relative homogeneity in the semi-presidential class. Again, we
note the irony that the intermediate category exhibits the lowest level of hybridity.
We were also curious about the robustness of our ﬁndings across alternative measures of
the classical categorization. Recall that of the four extant measures of the concept that we
assembled, we found a decided lack of convergence. Indeed, on average, any two of these
measures agreed with one another in only 60 per cent of cases. Accordingly, we tested
the predictive power of each of these variables. Not surprisingly, the Cheibub
58 Stepan and Skach 1993.
24 CHEIBUB, ELKINS AND GINSBURG
classiﬁcation, which is highly correlated with our measure (and, on average, most highly
correlated with the other measures), returned results that are very similar to ours: we
estimated a coefﬁcient of b5 0.05 for the same-system variable across the 4,095 dyads
covered. This effect is larger than the one we estimated with the CCP measure, and is
comparable in size to the effect of region but not era, whose effect (b5 0.21) is much
larger in that model.
CONCLUSION
It is worth reminding ourselves what is at stake in the choice of analytical concepts to
understand executive-legislative relations. As Moe and Caldwell note, with little exaggeration:
Consider the issue that has doubtless been the most enduring focus of institutional attention
since democracy ﬁrst became prevalent among western nations: is a separation of powers
system or a parliamentary system somehow better? It is hard to get more basic than this.
Historically, these are far-and-away the most common forms democracies have assumed,
and they are the usual starting points when designers begin thinking about what kind of
democracy they want to build for themselves.59
No one should doubt that the idea that the origin and survival of executives represent
an important constitutional distinction. But it seems possible that this distinction has
preoccupied scholars and constitution makers at the expense of other important
dimensions of executive-legislative relations – dimensions that may be orthogonal to
the classic distinction. This article has examined formal constitutional provisions of
presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems in order to assess the internal
cohesion of these classic categories. We recognize that formal constitutions provide only
partial guidance in understanding the allocation of powers within all types of systems.60
Nevertheless, formal provisions are central to most deﬁnitions under consideration, and
do capture the intentions of constitutional designers regarding governmental structure.61
Our analysis suggests a surprising collection of ﬁndings and, by implication, pronounced
skepticism regarding the classical typology of presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-
presidentialism. Many countries, it seems, are veritable hybrids, showing absolutely no
resemblance to the classic types across a long list of constitutional provisions concerning the
power of executives and legislatures. But our skepticism is differentiated: the three classical
types differ in their internal cohesion. Ironically, semi-presidential constitutions – a class
deﬁned by its hybrid nature – constitute the only class of constitutions that exhibit anything
approaching internal coherence. In general, however, the predictive capacity of the classical
concept is underwhelming. Indeed, as we note, in order to predict a constitution’s content,
one would do better to know the region or the century in which the constitution was written
than to know whether it was presidential or parliamentary.
In terms of guidance regarding the continued use of the classical taxonomy, we
conclude with some provisional alternative directions for usage and further research.
First, it seems clear to us that scholars need to be aware of the limited purchase of the
classical taxonomy. To scholars for whom ‘parliamentarism’ simply means ‘assembly
conﬁdence’ (a label that is speciﬁc about the deﬁning attribute), our ﬁndings will not give
pause. To the many other scholars for whom ‘parliamentarism’ connotes elective
59 Moe and Caldwell 1994, 171.
60 Duverger 1980, 179; Elgie 1999, 289.
61 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2010.
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attributes other than ‘assembly conﬁdence’, our ﬁndings should invite a shift in
consciousness and vocabulary. Speciﬁcally, it may be worth adopting the more concrete
labels ‘assembly conﬁdence executive’ and ‘directly elected executive’ over ‘presidential’
and ‘parliamentary’, respectively. The former labels have the virtue of clearly connoting
the deﬁnitional properties without furthering stereotypes. Such an approach also has the
virtue of overcoming confusion resulting from the fact that the nominal category of
‘presidents’ includes both ﬁgureheads in assembly conﬁdence republics and directly
elected heads of government.
Of course, even more descriptive labels are only useful if there is a particular theo-
retical purpose for focusing on the deﬁnitional attribute in question. As we argued at
the outset, scholars use the core categorization of government type to explain a wide
variety of political and economic outcomes. Many of these outcomes do not involve
stipulating a causal mechanism that depends on assembly conﬁdence. We ought to
then encourage more precise categorizations based on particular attributes of legislative-
executive relations that are believed to contribute to the outcome of interest. So, for
example, if it is the executive’s prerogative to propose legislation that promotes
government efﬁciency, scholars should analyze that feature speciﬁcally and not implicate
the broader concept of parliamentarism, which is tangential at best to the legislative
process.
One important caveat concerns measurement error. As we hope to have made clear, the
assessment of institutional similarity involves a set of measurement decisions, including
the selection of ‘elective’ properties, the computation of a similarity measure, the choice of
an appropriate measure of the classical categories, and the development of an appropriate
method to compare two-headed and one-headed executives. Our ﬁndings seem to hold
across a host of different methodological approaches, but all of our measurement choices
should be revisited and tested empirically.
Finally, as suggested above, it seems advisable to seriously consider alternative
conceptualizations of executive-legislative relations. Arraying cases along dimensions
such as executive or legislative ‘independence’ and ‘power’ are obvious alternatives to the
classic types.62 So too are well-known concepts such as Lijphart’s consensual-majoritarianism
and Tsebelis’ veto-players.63 Each of these concepts is related to the classical typology,
but each also identiﬁes an important theoretical dimension that cuts across the classic
distinction. One might also focus on partially aggregated measures of executive power (such
as executive power over lawmaking),64 which would encompass veto provisions, legislative
initiative and executive decree power. However, it could be that other, more incisive ways
of slicing cases will occur to the astute scholar. Undoubtedly, some such typologies
already exist. Indeed, with respect to semi-presidentialism, some of this re-categorization
is noticeably under way. Elgie hints at this in expressing the view that we should not be
focusing on normative issues about the classic distinction, but rather on those of more
discrete subtypes.65 We view all of these efforts as important contributions to an
understanding of executive-legislative relations that are at least as important to the
dominant classiﬁcation based on assembly conﬁdence, which is just not as systemic as
many believe it to be.
62 Fish and Kroenig 2009; Frye 1997; Metcalf 2000; O’Malley 2007.
63 See Lijphart 1984; Tsebelis 2002.
64 For example, Shugart and Carey 1992.
65 Elgie 1999, 10.
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